

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDA-05 AF-10

ARA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-07 PM-05 H-01 INR-07

L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02

PA-01 PRS-01 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 NRC-05 /139 W

-----086767 041751Z /45

P R 041243Z AUG 77

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9991

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION UN NEW YORK

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 6605

E O 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: CCD: US-USSR WORKING GROUP ON RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS/MASS

DESTRUCTION WEAPONS: ROUND TWO: FIRST MEETING, AUG 2, 1977:

MESSAGE NO. 4

REF: STATE 178687

1. SUMMARY: LIKHACHEV (USSR) IN PREPARED STATEMENT INTRODUCED NEW DEFINITION OF NEW MDW. ON BASIS OF PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS THEY ACCEPTED 1948 UN DEFINITION OF MDW AS STARTING POINT. HOWEVER, HE SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO INTRODUCE PRECISION INTO THAT DEFINITION SO AS TO DISTINGUISH MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING WEAPONS AND NEW WEAPONS OF FUTURE. HE READ DEFINITION WHICH HE CLAIMED SERVED THEIR STATED PURPOSE. HE SAID THEY ALSO WERE INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE IN THEIR DRAFT TREATY TO ENABLE EXTENSION OF PROHIBITION TO SPECIFIC WEAPONS OR TO NEW CLASSES OF WEAPONS. HE STRESSED THEIR
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APPROACH DID NOT TOUCH UPON WEAPONS COVERED BY TREATIES IN FORCE OR WEAPONS THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. THEIR DRAFT ALSO INCLUDED A SPECIFIC LIST OF WEAPONS TO BE PROHIBITED. HE HANDED OVER THEIR DRAFT TREATY (SEPTTEL). FISHER (US) SAID US VIEW GENERALLY FAVORS DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENT TO LIMIT INDIVIDUAL TYPES OF WEAPONS. HE SAID 1948 UN DEFINITION OF MDW WAS SATISFACTORY. HE NOTED

THAT OF TYPES OF MDW LISTED IN DEFINITION ONLY RW HAD NOT BEEN DEALT WITH IN SPECIFIC TERMS. US WAS NOW PREPARED TO BEGIN NEGOTIATION ON RW AGREEMENT. FISHER THEN LISTED FOUR ELEMENTS (CONTAINED REFTTEL) THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. END SUMMARY

2. LIKHATCHEV (USSR) AND FISHER (US) INTRODUCED RESPECTIVE DELEGATIONS (SEPTTEL FOR SOVIET DEL LIST). LIKHATCHEV THEN SATATED THAT THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS WERE MDW AND RW. FISHER SAID THAT WE PUT THESE SUBJECT IN THE REVERSE ORDER, BUT AGREED THAT THESE WERE SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION.

3. LIKHATCHEV BEGAN BY STATING THAT ONE PROBLEM TO SOLVE WITH RESPECT TO MDW WAS CONNECTED WITH SCOPE OF PROHIBITION OVER WHICH "LIVELY DISCUSSION" HAD TAKEN PLACE IN THE PAST. BASED UPON THESE PAST DISCUSSIONS HE THOUGHT IT WAS NOW POSSIBLE TO PROPOSE A SOLUTION. THERE WAS A NEED FOR A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE DEFINITION OF WHAT WAS A NEW TYPE OR NEW SYSTEM OF MDW. HE SAID HIS REMARKS TODAY WOULD FOCUS ON THE MATTER AND LATER HE WOULD PUT FORWARD OTHER IDEAS ON SCOPE AND OTHER QUESTIONS, INCLUDING RW.

4. LIKHATCHEV SAID THEIR BASIC LINE OF THOUGHT WAS TO USE 1948 UN DEFINITION OF MDW AS STARTING POINT. HE NOTED THAT US DELEGATION HAD SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO ACCEPT THIS
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DEFINITION. REGARDING NEW MDW THERE WERE TWO ELEMENTS: NEWNESS AND COMPARABILITY WITH KNOWN TYPES OF MDW. HE SAID THE 1948 DEFINITION NEEDED TO BE GIVEN MORE PRECISION ON BOTH OF THESE

ELEMENTS. WITH RESPECT TO THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF NEW MDW, HE SAID THE 1948 DEFINITION DOES NOT PERMIT ONE TO DRAW A CLEAR CUT DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXISTING WEAPONS WHICH ARE MODERNIZED AND THOSE NEW WEAPONS WHICH CAN BE CREATED IN FUTURE. TO ELIMINATE AMBIGUITIES THEY SUGGESTED FOLLOWING WORDING: "NEW TYPES AND NEW SYSTEMS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SHALL INCLUDE WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEVELOPED IN THE FUTURE EITHER ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENTLY KNOWN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES THAT UP TO DATE WERE NOT APPLIED, SINGLY OR JOINTLY, FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR ON THE BASIS OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES THAT MAY BE DISCOVERED IN THE FUTURE." LIKHATCHEV SAID THERE WOULD BE NO DOUBT THAT NEW MDW WERE PROHIBITED AND NOT SOMETHING ELSE. HE SAID THIS DEFINITION COULD BE STATED IN A FORM MORE CLOSE TO 1948 UN DEFINITION, AND ALSO NOTE AND POINT TO POSSIBILITIES TO EVEN MORE DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS BY ADDITION OF FOLLOWING PHRASE: "AND WHICH WILL HAVE CHARACTERISTICS

OF THEIR DESTRUCTIVE AND/OR INJURY EFFECT SIMILAR TO OR SURPASSING THOSE OF THE KNOWN TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION." THIS DEFINITION IS FOUND IN PARA I OF ARTICLE I OF THEIR DRAFT TREATY.

5. TO REFLECT THE POSSIBILITY OF GOING FROM A GENERAL TYPE

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OF AGREEMENT TO A SPECIFIC AGREEMENT THEY SUGGESTED INCLUSION OF A PARAGRAPH WHICH WOULD STATE THAT THE PARTIES TO TREATY MAY IF NECESSARY CONCLUDE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS ON SINGLE NEW TYPES OF MDW. HE SAID THIS PARA TOGETHER WITH A PROPOSED PARA 2 OF ART I, WHICH PROVIDES FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO EXTEND PROHIBITION TO NEW AREAS OF MDW NOT COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT, CREATES THE CLEAR POSSIBILITY OF EXPANDING THE PROVISIONS OF THE PROHIBITION AS THE NEED ARISES. HE SAID THIS REFLECTED US VIEWS.

6. LIKHATCHEV THEN STRESSED THAT THEIR DRAFT DOES NOT TOUCH UPON TYPES OR SYSTEMS OF WEAPONS COVERED BY TREATIES IN FORCE, OR THOSE WHICH ARE CURRENTLY BEING ELABORATED UPON. HE ALSO ADDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION ASSUMES IT DOES NOT COVER NEW VARIANTS OF PRESENT SYSTEMS. THIS, HE SAID, REFERRED IN PART TO WEAPONS WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT MATTER OF SALT. FINALLY, HE NOTED THAT A PROPOSED ANNEX INCLUDED A SPECIFIC LIST OF WEAPONS TO BE PROHIBITED AND ON WHICH HE WOULD

SPEAK AT THE NEXT MEETING. HE HANDED OVER DRAFT TREATY

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TEXT (SEPTTEL).

7. FISHER THEN READ PREPARED STATEMENT. HE FIRST NOTED THE DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH OF THE TWO SIDES AND EXPRESSED SOME SURPRISE AT THE EXTENT OF THE DIFFERENCE AS REFLECTED IN SOVIET STATEMENT. HE STATED THAT US VIEW GENERALLY FAVORS DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS TO LIMIT INDIVIDUAL TYPES OF WEAPONS; NEVERTHELESS, THE US WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH AND WOULD LISTEN WITH INTEREST TO SOVIET IDEAS AND STUDY THEM.

8. FISHER SAID HE WAS GRATIFIED TO SEE THAT SOVIET APPROACHED HAD BEGUN WITH 1948 DEFINITION OF MDW, ALTHOUGH TWO SIDES MAY REACH DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS. HE NOTED THAT DEFINITION SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO "RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL WEAPONS", AND ONLY THIS TYPE OF WEAPON OF THE FOUR MENTIONED IN DEFINITION HAD NOT BEEN DEALT WITH IN ANY EXPLICIT AGREEMENT. IT WAS THE US VIEW IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE THAT SUCH WEAPONS BE SUBJECT TO AN AGREEMENT. FISHER SAID UN DEFINITION WAS SATISFACTORY AND IT WAS BETTER TO DEAL EXPLICITLY WITH ITS IMPLICATION TO DEAL WITH RW RATHER THAN DECIDE DEFINITION WAS INADEQUATE.

9. FISHER RECALLED THAT IN PREVIOUS ROUND SOVIET SIDE HAD SAID IT WAS PREPARED TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON RW. HE SAID US WAS NOW PREPARED TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON SUCH AGREEMENT, PROCEEDING ON A BILATERAL BASIS TO POINT WHEN IT SEEMS APPROPRIATE TO SUBMIT PROPOSAL THAT CCD COULD CARRY TO COMPLETION. FISHER THEN LISTED THE FOUR ELEMENTS THAT, IN US VIEW, SUCH AN AGREEMENT SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, DRAWING DIRECTLY ON CONTENT OF PARA 4 OF GUIDANCE (STATE 178687). STATEMENT OF FOUR ELEMENTS READ AS FOLLOWS:

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(A) THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD INCLUDE A COMMITMENT NOT TO USE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS AS RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, BY THAT I MEAN WEAPONS THAT PRODUCE DESTRUCTIVE RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS AS A RESULT OF RADIOACTIVE DECAY;

(B) THE AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE AN UNDERTAKING BY EACH PARTY TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO ASSURE THAT RADIOACTIVE

MATERIALS THAT MIGHT BE USED AS RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE NOT LOST OR DIVERTED; HOWEVER, CARE MUST BE TAKEN IN CONSTRUCTING PROVISIONS ALONG THESE LINES TO ENSURE THAT THEY CANNOT BE CONSTRUED IN WAYS THAT MIGHT WEAKEN OTHER OBLIGATIONS TO SAFEGUARD NUCLEAR MATERIALS.

(C) AS I INDICATED IN POINT (1), THE US BELIEVES THAT ANY AGREEMENT SHOULD APPLY ONLY TO RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS THAT PRODUCE RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS AS A RESULT OF RADIOACTIVE DECAY. FOR THAT REASON, IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT THE AGREEMENT WILL NOT APPLY TO DIRECT RADIATION FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS OR TO THE OTHER CONSEQUENCES OF DETONATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS, INCLUDING RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT; AND THAT THE AGREEMENT WILL NOT APPLY TO THE USE OF DEPLETED URANIUM IN CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION OR TO THE USE OF SMALL QUANTITIES OF RADIO-ISOTOPES IN MILITARY ELECTRONIC OR OTHER EQUIPMENT.

(D) THE AGREEMENT ITSELF SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT NOTHING IN THE AGREEMENT SHALL BE INTERPRETED AS IN ANY WAY LIMITING OR DETRACTING FROM THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY ANY STATE UNDER THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925 OR FROM ANY OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICT.

10. LIKHACHEV SAID THEY WOULD STUDY THE STATEMENT AND REPLY LATER. HE AGAIN STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION STOOD READY TO UNDERTAKE A SPECIFIC EXAMINATION OF ELABORATION OF RW TREATY.

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11. NEXT MEETING, 3:30 P.M. AUGUST 3, AT U.S. MISSION.
VANDEN HEUVEL

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
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Sent Date: 04-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
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Subject: CCD: US-USSR WORKING GROUP ON RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS/MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS: ROUND TWO: FIRST MEETING, AUG 2, 1977: MESSAGE NO. 4
TAGS: PARM, MASS
To: STATE
Type: TE
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